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THE REGULATION OF
ORGANIZATIONAL AND
RECOGNITIONAL PICKETING UNDER
SECTION 8(b)(7) OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
JOSEPH R. CROWLEY*
The history of labor legislation in the United States reflects a con-
cern on the part of the Congress to achieve a balance between the rights
of labor and management.
Initially in enacting the Wagner Act,' the Congress recognized that
the weapons in the arsenal of management such as, surveillance, dis-
charges, and black lists were most efficacious in thwarting the efforts of
labor in the organization and representation of employees. Congress
thereupon proclaimed the rights of employees to organize for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining and proscribed certain conduct on the
part of employees which interfered with the free exercise of these rights.
Twelve years later the Congress, apparently noting the development
of an imbalance in labor management relations, enacted the Taft-
Hartley Act2 which evidenced an awareness on the part of our federal
legislature that labor need be reminded, perhaps forcibly, that the in-
tended beneficiary of the Wagner Act was not labor organizations, but
those for whom such organizations were created.
The hearings held by Senate Select Committee on Improper Activi-
ties in the Labor Management Field, during the late 1950's, demon-
strated that some individuals and organizations in the trade union move-
ment had not only ignored the congressional reminder of 1947, but were
utilizing the laws, enacted by the Congress to guarantee the employee's
rights, as a means of denying employees the free exercise of these same
rights.3
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; A.B. 1940,
LL.B. 1945, Fordham University.
'National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§151 (1958).
2Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §151 (1958).
3 I LEGISLATIvE HIsToRY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIscLosuRE
ACT OF 1959, at 446 (Hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.).
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Thus the Congress in 1959 (apparently labor legislation occurs in a
duodecimal cycle) enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act,4 to remedy these
abuses and to assure some minimal standard of democratic processes
in internal union affairs.
A portion of the remedy provided by the Congress dealt with regu-
lation of organizational and recognitional picketing by uncertified
onions. The McClellan Committee found that the traditional weapon of
organizational picketing had been used on occasions, not only in dis-
regard of the wishes of employees but also to restrain or coerce em-
ployees in the selection and acceptance of a collective bargaining repre-
sentative. 5
In formulating a remedy, the Congress had a most difficult task.
Picketing had long been the right arm of the labor movement in its
efforts not only to organize employees but also to secure advancement
in the living standards of the American worker. Congress had to re-
move the cancer of abuse from the arm and the surgery had to be so
exact as not to deprive the patient of the use of the arm. Its use would
be restricted but it could still function.
A reading of the statutory remedy adopted by the Congress makes
it clear that there was no intention to proscribe all picketing but only
picketing with an object of recognition, bargaining or organization and
then only in three situations.6
4 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin), Act
of Sept. 14, 1959, ch. 257, 73 Stat. 519.
5 1 LEG. HisT. 470.
6 Congress amended the Taft-Hartley Act by adding a new section, §8(b) (7),
which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization:
"(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to
be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the repre-
sentative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an
employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bar-
gaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified
as the representative of such employees:
"(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with
this Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representa-
tion may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act,
"(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under
section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
"(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed
thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That
when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without
regard to the provisions of section 9(c) (1) or the absence of a showing of
a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election
in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the re-
sults thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C)
shall be construed to prohibit picketing or other publicity for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does
not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, un-
less an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any
other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or
transport any goods or not to perform any services.
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A review however of the decisions of the Board construing the legis-
lation regulating such picketing by an uncertified union makes it equally
clear that there exists in the Board as presently constituted sharp dis-
agreement as to the intent of the Congress and in the interpretation of
the language used by the Congress.
This article will discuss and analyze these decisions, to consider
whether the Board's administration of section 8(b) (7) is in accord
with congressional intent and whether in fact the objective of the en-
actment is being realized.
'Only subdivisions B and C of section 8(b) (7) will be considered for
there is a dearth of decisions dealing with subdivision A and the dis-
cussion of subdivision B will in many instances be applicable to
subdivision A.
Subdivision B
This subdivision of section 8(b) (7) enjoys a simplicity of language
shared to a degree by subdivision A but far beyond that of subdivision
C. It bars organizational and recognitional picketing "where within the
preceding twelve months a valid election under section 9(c) of this Act
has been conducted."
The meaning is quite explicit 7 and at first blush would appear to
reflect accurately the intent of the Congress in enacting it, viz., to bar
"picketing for organizational purposes or union recognition for 12
months after an election in order to secure the expressed desire of the
employees." 8 Yet as pointed out by Professor Cox there was not any
unanimity of intention in Congress as to what would be accomplished
in the construction and interpretation of the language of the statuteY
There were some members of the Congress who seemingly concluded
that the language of the statute ijt toto was such as to effectively ban all
picketing for 12 months by an uncertified union after an election in
which "No Union" was the choice of the majority of the employees.' 0
Admittedly the ban is expressly limited to picketing which has an or-
"Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which
would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b)."7Kennedy v. Los Angeles Joint Exec. Board, 192 F. Supp. 339, 342 (S. D.
Cal. 1961).
8 II LEG. HIST. 1433 (3); Similarly Senator Morse's statement, "I do not be-
lieve that the day after the vote, the employer should have to wake up and
see a picket line in front of his plant .... I think it is reasonable to provide
rules of the game . . . that vill give such an employer protection from having
a picket line stretched before his plant, for at least a period of reasonable
time." II LEG. HIST. 1428(1).
9 Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendment to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 266 (1959).
10 Congressman MacDonald: "Unless the union won the election picketing would
have to cease." II LEG. HIsT. 1810(2). Congressman Perkins: "We bar any
picketing at all for a year after a union has lost a Labor Board election."
Id. at 1728(1). See also Senator Morse's statements note 8 supra and Senator
Kennedy's statement, "I suggest that perhaps a much better procedure would
be to provide that for a certain period of time following a legitimate election,
there could not be picketing." II LEG. HIST. 1182(3)-1183(1).
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ganizational or recognitional objective yet it could be anticipated that if
these two latter objectives were to be accorded their full measure the
ban would have been a rather all encompassing one."x
Some courts however in giving this subdivision its initial judicial
construction were reluctant to give to it this effect. In considering the
proscriptions of section 8(b) (7) generally a distinction was made be-
tween the ultimate and immediate object of the picketing 2 reasoning that
every union has as its ultimate purpose the organization of all employees
in the particular industry in which the union functions and that it would
be unreasonable to construe subdivision B as including within its pro-
scriptions picketing which had this ultimate objective as distinguished
from a reasonably immediate object of recognition or organization."
The validity of this reasoning is not entirely clear particularly in
view of the facts in the case espousing it.'" For example in Graham v.
Retail Clerks International Ass'n Local 15715 the legend on the picket
signs read "Hested had No Clerks Union Contract and Non-Union
Clerks."'16 The court reasoned that this picketing would not constitute
a violation of this subdivision unless there was some evidence, other
than the picketing itself, to establish a reasonably immediate object of
forcing or requiring recognition or organization and absent such evi-
dence the picketing would be considered purely informational." This
would appear to ignore the fact as recognized by the Board' s that a
legend indicating that the employer does not employ members of the
union clearly imports a present object of organization and a legend in-
dicating the absence of a contract with the union clearly implies a
recognitional object.' 9
This approach by the courts in this early period of the subdivision's
interpretation and construction would appear contrary to congressional
intent.20 Picketing such as in the Graham case would have the same
11 Kennedy v. Los Angeles Joint Exec. Board, supra note 7, at 342 n. 2.12 Getreu v. Local 58, Bartenders, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 181 F.
Supp. 738 (N.D. Ind. 1960).13These cases all arose upon petitions by Regional Directors for a temporary
injunction pursuant to §10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended.
Brown Department Store Employees, 187 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Cal. 1960);
Cavers v. Teamsters "General" Local 200, 188 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Wis. 1960);
Penello v. Retail Stores Employees, 188 F. Supp. 192 (D.C. Md. 1960), aff'd,
287 F. 2d 509 (4th Cir. 1961). Graham v. Retail Clerks International Ass'n.
Local #57,188 F. Supp. 847 (D.C. Mont. 1960).
14 See note 13 supra.
15 Graham v. Retail Clerks International Ass'n., Local #57, supra note 13.
Is Id. at 857.
21 Id. at 858.
1s Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183, 49 L.R.R.M. 1648 (1962).
19 The term "informational" used to describe picketing here is not to be confused
with the informational picketing proviso in subdivision C of §8(b) (7) which
proviso is not applicable to subdivision B cases. Penello v. Retail Store Em-
ployees, supra note 13; II LEG. HIST. 1812(3).
20 Speaker Rayburn: "When the Labor Board conducts an election, all the
employees have a free opportunity to indicate their choice of bargaining
representative. If they vote not to be represented by a union, their choice
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coercive effect upon employers and employees whether the activity of
the union was limited solely to picketing or whether the union imple-
mented the picketing by an unequivocal demand for recognition. The
point is not that it may be more desirable to permit consumer appeal by
the union after an election by way of informational picketing, rather the
point is whether the Congress intended to ban it. It would seem that
the Congress did so intend.21
The Board while indicating a reluctance to rely upon the rationale
of the Graham case,2 2 does take the position however that "informa-
tional picketing divorced from any object of recognition, bargaining or
organization falls outside the literal scope of section 8(b) (7) alto-
gether. ' '2' No one can dispute this position because the proscriptions of
section 8(b) (7) are directed only against picketing for recognition,
bargaining or organization, however the difficulty is in the determination
of whether such "informational picketing" is, or can be, divorced from
the proscribed objects. The decisions of the Board with respect to "in-
formational picketing" under subdivision B not only reflect this diffi-
culty but at times contribute to it.
These decisions indicate that a more definitive term than informa-
tional picketing would be "protest picketing" because most of the de-
cisions deal with picketing in protest of (a) unfair labor practices ;24
(b) the discharge of employees or the refusal to rehire strikers 5 (c)
substandard wages or working conditions.26 The Board's general posi-
tion is that picketing in protest of an unfair labor practice or in protest
of substandard or non-union conditions or to obtain reinstatement is not
per se a demand for recognition or bargaining.27 This represents a re-
versal of prior rulings of the Board.28
(a) Picketing in Protest of Employer's Unfair Labor Practice
It should be made quite clear that the mere fact that an employer
may have committed an unfair labor practice does not provide a defense
should be respected. For a union to picket their employer after losing an
election is an attempt to coerce the employees into supporting the union
against their express desire." II LEG. HIST. 1576 (3).
21Congressman Kearns, II LEG. HIST. 1750(2) (1959). See also Vincent v.
Local 182, IBT, 48 L.R.R.M. 2132 (1961) ; N.L.R.B. v. Local 182, IBT, 314
F. 2d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1963) ; note 11 supra.22Bachman Furniture Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 670, 49 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1961).
23 Crown Cafeteria, Supplemental Decision, supra note 18; "[T]he thrust of all
the section 8(b) (7) provisions, both structurally and grammatically is directed
only against picketing for recognition bargaining or organization and not
against picketing for other objects." Mission Valley Inn, 140 N.L.R.B.
52 L.R.R.M. 1023, 1024 (1963).24 Bachman Furniture Co., supra note 22.
25 Mission Valley Inn, 140 N.L.R.B. - , 52 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1963).26 Alton Myers Brothers, 136 N.L.R.B. 1270, 49 L.R.R.M. 1969 (1962).
2? Mission Valley Inn, supra note 25; Fanelli Ford Sales, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B.
1468, 49 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1961); Calumet Contractors Assn., 133 N.L.R.B.
512, 48 L.R.R.M. 1667 (1961) ; Claude Everett Construction Co., 136 N.L.R.B.
321, 49 L.R.R.M. 1757 (1962).
2sLevis Food Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 890, 37 L.R.R.M. 1421 (1956); Calumet Con-
tractors Assn., 130 N.L.R.B. 78, 47 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1961).
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for picketing which has an organizational or recognitional objective.
Although there was concern upon the part of the Congress that the ban
of section 8(b) (7) should not apply to picketing in protest of an em-
ployer's unfair labor practice2 9 it is the fact that the Senate conferees
attempted without success to amend section 10(1) of the Act so as to
provide that any unfair labor practice on the part of the employer
would be a defense to a section 8(b) (7) charge.3 0 Thus the conclusion
would appear warranted that picketing in protest of an employer's un-
fair labor practice would violate section 8(b) (7) unless divorced from
a proscribed object.3 1
Accordingly, for the majority of the Board, the primary issue in
determining whether or not protest picketing violates the ban of sub-
division B is whether the true motive for the picketing is protestation
or whether the protest is a device to conceal a proscribed motive.
In determining the issue of motive the Board has indicated that it
may find "a serviceable guideline in the more familiar area of criteria
for determining motive in section 8(a) (3) discharge cases,' 32 pointing
out that
Unlawful motivation in picketing situations, as intent in dis-
charge cases, is not often proved by admission. Rather, the mo-
tive for the act in question, be it discharge or picketing, must be
ascertained from the context of preceding and subsequent as
well as attendant circumstances. While denials or disavowals of
unlawful objectives may not be discounted because they are self-
serving, they nevertheless are not to be credited merely because
they are uttered.3 3
An analysis of two decisions under subdivision B, by the Board,
relating to picketing in protest of unfair labor practices by an employer
illustrate the difficulty in resolving the question of motive.34 Both cases
involved post election picketing in protest of unfair labor practices. In
both cases the unfair labor practices were disposed of, one by the em-
ployer complying with the remedial provisions of the trial examiner's
report, the other by an informal settlement agreement between the em-
ployer and the union.' 5 In the former the Board found a violation of
section 8(b) (7) (B) concluding that the protest picketing was merely
a device by the union to conceal its true objective, viz. recognition. In
reaching this conclusion the Board considered the fact that the union
29 11 LEG. HIST. 1384(2), 1428(3), 1429(l), 1714(3).
30 11 LEG. HisT. 1383(2). The amendment as finally adopted provided that no
injunctive relief shall be sought under §10(1) of the Act if there is reasonable
cause to believe that an 8(a) (2) violation exists.
31The Board decision in C. A. Blinne Construction Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153,
49 L.R.R.M. 1638 (1962), re a meritorious §8(a) (5) change being a defense
to an §8(b) (7) (c) change will be discussed infra.
32 Bachman Furniture Co., supra note 22.
33 Bahia Motor Hotel, 132 N.L.R.B. 737, 48 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1961).
3a Bachman Furniture Co., supra note 22; Bahia Motor Hotel, supra note 33.
35 Ibid.
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had acquiesced in the finding that the employer had remedied the unfair
labor practice and thus it was "not apparent what further corrective
action short of recognition, the Union hoped to secure by publicizing the
foregoing unfair labor practice."3 6 It would seem that the same reasoning
would have been equally applicable to the latter case,3 7 yet the Board
adopted the reasoning of the trial examiner to the effect that this protest
picketing, with the resultant loss of patronage, would provide further
assurance that the employer would not again interfere with the rights
of the employees.3s Admittedly there were other factors which do make
the two cases dissimilar but which do not overcome or explain this dis-
parity in the reasoning of the two cases.
39
The Board appears to have overlooked or at least minimized the
realities of the situation. If an employer has remedied an unfair labor
practice, to the satisfaction of the Board, and a union thereafter pickets
to protest the same misconduct, what is available to the employer to re-
move the picket line which adversely affects his business? There is
naught he can do save bargain with the union. It cannot be denied that
the picketing will act to force him to recognize the union. If there is no
other recourse open to the employer, it would follow that the picketing
in protest of an unfair labor practice which has been remedied is not
divorced from a proscribed object and thus would be within the pro-
scriptions of subdivision B.
(b) Picketing in Protest of Substandard Wages and Conditions
As noted previously, the Board has taken the position that picketing
to protest substandard wages or working conditions does not per se
constitute picketing for an object of recognition or bargaining.40 This
position if it is to be one of broad application would appear certainly
to be in conflict with the clear language and meaning of the statute.
Congress has proscribed picketing for a recognitional or bargaining
object after an NLRB election and picketing to secure conditions which
are normally obtained in collective bargaining must logically be pre-
sumed to constitute a demand for recognition.
36 Bachman Furniture Co., supra note 22.
37 See Bahia Motor Hotel, supra note 33.
3
8 B achman Furniture Co., supra note 22.
39 In the Bahia case, there was pre-election picketing for recognition and bar-
gaining purposes; the protest picketing did not begin until over a year
subsequent to the commission of an unfair labor practice and then only upon
the certification of the union's loss of the election. In the Bachman case, there
was no pre-election picketing, in fact five of the seven employees in the unit
approached the union on their own initiative asking to be organized and paid
a steep initiation fee so it is fair to assume that the dissipation of interest
reflected in the election was at least in part occasioned by the employer's
misconduct.
40 Calumet Contractors Ass'n, supra note 27 on 8(b) (4) (c) case; Claude Everett
Construction Co., supra note 27 on 8(b) (7) (c) case; Alton Myers Bros.,
supra note 26 on 8(b) (7) (B) case.
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It would seem unlikely that it is within the allowable area of the
Board's discretion in carrying out congressional policy to remove from
the proscriptions of section 8(b) (7) conduct which is clearly proscribed.
However in taking this stand the Board has not acted out of pure
caprice, there is an area of legitimate concern. For as Professor Cox
pointed out, the banning of organizational picketing after an NLRB
election results in a preference being granted to nonunion employees'
interest in self-determination over the union's interest in spreading its
organization as a means of protecting its wage scale and labor stand-
ards. 41 In brief, if the low wages or substandard conditions constitute
a substantial threat to existing labor standards, the union should be per-
mitted to protest and to utilize as their mode of protestation the tradi-
tional method of labor, i.e., picketing.42
The Board however in applying its rule has not so limited its appli-
cation rather it would permit this protest picketing after an election
absent any evidence, other than the picketing itself, of a proscribed
object.
For example in the Alton M1lyers case43 the union at the time of the
election in December 1958, was seeking to represent the employees. In
the picketing following the election this objective continued until June
1959 when according to the testimony of a union official, the union
abandoned all efforts to organize and the picketing thereafter was to
enlist public support against the employers nonunion standards. 4 The
general counsel contended that as the picketing was continuous and as
originally, it had an organizational object, this objective should be pre-
sumed to have continued. The Board rejected the application of the
presumption on the ground that there was no substantial independent
evidence to support it.45 The Board, in reaching this conclusion, un-
doubtedly relied upon the testimony of the union official that an organi-
zational objective had been abandoned because absent such a declared
change of object it would seem that the General Counsel's contention
should have been sustained.46 The reliance however upon such testimony
is questionable in view of the fact it does not appear that the change in
objective was communicated to the employer contemporaneously with
the change and in fact was not declared publicly until post motam
litam, and fails to heed Professor Cox's warning in this regard.47
41 Cox, supra note 9, at 266-67.
42 Ibid.
43 Alton Myers Bros., supra note 26.
44 The legend on the picket signs read "Please Do Not Patronize."
45 Here the Board cited N.L.R.B. v. Bakers Union, 245 F. 2d 542, 547 (2d Cir.
1957).
46 The Board was not bound to accept at face value this disclaimer but was
entitled to consider the totality of the union's conduct. N.L.R.B. v. Local 182,
IBT, supra note 21.
4 "The danger in distinguishing picketing to protest substandard wages or
working conditions from picketing for union recognition or organization is
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In summary the Board should reverse the order of things,. that is
to say, that picketing to protest substandards should be presumed to be
for the purpose of organization or recognition but that such presump-
tion "can be dissipated by proof that the labor conditions of which the
union complains are presently a substantial threat to existing standards
in other shops as to support a finding that the union has a genuine in-
terest in compelling the improvement of labor conditions or eliminating
the competition, even though the union does not become the bargaining
representative. '48
Absent such a criterion any union could seemingly circumvent sub-
division B by (1) announcing prior to an election (which it knows it
can not win) that it has abandoned its organizational objective, (2)
refrain from any contact with the employer or employees, (3) announce
its protest of substandard conditions, (4) utilize picket signs in accord
with such protest.
The objection to the Board's position in protest picketing in this
category is not that it is reluctant to find independent evidence of a
proscribed object because it is not 9 but rather because it will substan-
tially defeat the purpose of the subdivision and stultify it.
In closing, it is interesting to note an intriguing suggestion by a
court of appeals that section 8(b) (7) would not apply if one union
were picketing merely to persuade the employer to recognize another.5"
Intriguing but it is unlikely that such a course of conduct would pass
unmolested.
(c) Picketing to Protest the Discharge of Employee or the Refusal to
Rehire Strikers
The Board in 1956 in LezeAs Food Company had held that striking
or picketing to obtain reinstatement of a discharged employee neces-
sarily was to compel recognition or bargaining.5 ' In 1961, in Fanelli
Ford Sales the Board overruled this holding on the ground that while
that it may encourage verbal evasions through disingenous phrasing of the
pickets' placards and union demands." Cox, supra note 9, at 267.
48 Cox, supra note 9, at 267.
49 Ames Iga Foodliner, 136 N.L.R.B. 778, 49. L.R.R.M. 1852 (1962). Here the
legend on the picket sign "We Do Not Patronize List" was almost identical
with the legend in Alton Myers Bros., supra note 26. However, there was
testimony that the employer was placed on the unfair list because of a re-
fusal to recognize and bargain with the union. As this was the same Inter-
national Union in both cases, one might surmise that the purpose of the "We
Do Not Patronize" was the same in each case. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
139 N.L.R.B. 1477,.51 L.R.R.M. 1552 (1962). Here although union disclaimed
interest in representing the employees and the picket legend only mentioned
that the employer was non-union, the Board found a violation of subdivision
B because of a statement by a union representative that the picket line would
be withdrawn only upon execution of a contract. See also Woodward Motors
Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 851, 49 L.R.R.M. 1577 (1962); Joiner, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B.
876, 49 L.R.R.M. 1592 (1962).
50 N.L.R.B. v. Local 182, IBT, supra note 21, at 58.
51 Lewis Food Company, supra note 28.
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recognizing that picketing for an employee's reinstatement may be used
as a pretext for obtaining recognition, some independent evidence of a
broader objective must be shown.52 Thus absent evidence to indicate
that the picketing would not cease if reinstatement were granted, such
picketing does not violate section 8(b) (7).
While this stand of the Board has a basic appeal in the light of the
complexities existing in the relations between labor and management,
its validity can not properly be considered if viewed in the abstract.
In a recent case the Board held that where the objective of the pic-
keting both before and after the election had been the reinstatement of
strikers, the "object cannot reasonably be regarded as in the nature of a
pretext to mask a covert demand for recognition and bargaining. ' 53 In
that case the union filed a representation petition. While the election was
pending, the union struck the employer and set up a picket line to pro-
test unfair labor practices.- The charges were found to be meritorious
and were disposed of by way of a unilateral settlement agreement en-
tered into by the employer in which the employer agreed to reinstate
certain strikers and to place others on a preferential hiring list. The
union appealed from the refusal of General Counsel to issue a complaint
on the charges. The appeal was denied on the ground that the settlement
agreement "adequately disposes of the charges in this case." 55 The
legends on the placards were thereupon changed so as to limit the pro-
test to the employer's refusal to rehire all the strikers.58 This picketing
continued to and beyond the certification of the union's loss of the elec-
tion.
The changing of the legends on the placards (six months before the
election) was deemed by the Board to be a renunciation of a bargaining
objective 57 and therefore and thereafter the picketing was solely to ob-
tain reinstatement. The Board concluded that as this is not a proscribed
object, there is no violation of subdivision B.58
52 Fanelli Ford Sales, supra note 27.
53 Mission Valley Inn, supra note 25.
54 The legends on the picket signs read:
"We protest Unfair Labor Practices of Mission Valley Inn"
"We protest Employer's Interrogation of Employees"
"MVI says it will refuse to Bargain in Good Faith if Union Wins Election."
55 Mission Valley Inn, supra note 25.
56 "We protest Mission Valley Inn's Refusal to Rehire All Unfair Labor Practice
Strikers."
"22 Employees Struck Because Mission Valley Inn Engaged in Unfair Labor
'Practice-MVI Now Will Take Back Only Part of Employees-MVI is
Reaping Benefit of Unfair Labor Practice Without Rectifying Situation."
57 The Board noted that nothing in the conduct of the union after this renunci-
ation was not inconsistent with it.
58 The Board finds support for its conclusion in Dirksen and Goldwater, State-
ment of Minority Views S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959) on S.
1555, I LEG. HIST. 473. However, in the cited reference in notes 6 and 9 of
the Board's decision, Mission Valley Inn, supra note 25, the Senators speak
of picketing to remedy an unfair labor practice, in the instant case the charges
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In reaching this conclusion the Board emphasized that it refused to
give recognition to the union's claim that it was engaged in unfair labor
practice picketing on the ground that in the light of the settlement agree-
ment and compliance therewith, the unfair labor practice must be deemed
to have been remedied and the case closed.
It seems illogical on the one hand to say that to accord recognition
to a continued protest against unfair labor practices in this circumstance
would be inconsistent with the Board's obligation to respect administra-
tive practice and would impinge upon the statutory authority of the Gen-
eral Counsel, and on the other hand to permit picketing to gain a result
denied in the same administrative proceeding.
It would seem appropriate that the Board should consider modifying
its holding in the Fanelli case and resurrect the Lewis Food rule in cases
where the protested discharge or refusal to reinstate has been the sub-
ject of an unfair labor practice which has been remedied administra-
tively or otherwise. In other circumstances the Board's position has
validity however.
Assume that a union attempted to organize employees of X Com-
pany. An election is held and the union loses. Subsequently X discharges
two employees because of their activities in furtherance of union or-
ganization. The union thereupon initiates a picket line to protest the dis-
charge and to force the employer to reinstate the employees. If this be
established as the sole objective of the picketing, it would appear that
the Board is warranted in saying that such picketing would not be pro-
hibited by Subdivision B. Congress intended to protect the employer
from coercion by way of picketing and did not intend to provide a
shield for an employer's misconduct.
(d) Validity of Election
Subdivision B, by its terms, has application only if there were a
valid election,59 therefore an essential element of a violation of this sub-
division is the conduct of a valid election within the preceding year.60
The issue of the validity of an election in a subdivision B proceeding
has arisen in several cases where an expedited election has been con-
ducted pursuant to the first proviso', of subdivision C of section 8(b)
(7). In brief this proviso permits an election to be conducted "without
regard to the provisions of section 9 (c) (1)."12 Under this proviso cer-
have been rendered by way of settlement agreement and compliance with
such agreement.
59 "B" where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under §9(c)
of this Act has been conducted.
00 Hested Stores Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 1393, 51 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1962).
61 See note 81 infra.
62This proviso will be considered in detail infra in the discussion of subdivision
C in text.
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tain requirements are dispensed with so that the election can be expe-
dited.6
3
The point of inquiry in these cases was whether an expedited elec-
tion was permissible under the circumstances. It is the Board's position
that if an election was expedited under the first proviso of subdivision
C it would be a valid election only if the pre-election picketing was
conducted in violation of subdivision C.11 The Board reasons that if the
picketing does not violate subdivision C the holding of an expedited
election would exceed the Board's authority. 5
In the Oakland G. R. Kinney Co., Inc. case6 6 an expedited election
was held in which the union was unsuccessful. The picketing continued
after the election and an 8(b) (7) (B) charge was filed and a complaint
issued. The Board refused to sustain the complaint on the ground that
although the pre-election picketing was for a proscribed object, it did
not violate section 8(b) (7) (C) because the picketing was substantially
for the purpose of advising the public of the employer's non-union
operation and was thus within the publicity proviso of subdivision C.6 '
Therefore the Board concluded that "such publicity proviso picket-
ing is permissible and not in violation of the Act nor subject to an
expedited election unless it has the effect of inducing stoppages of de-
liveries or services. It follows that as there were no stoppages the ex-
pedited election in this case was improperly directed."
Accordingly the Board found that the election was not a valid one
within the meaning of subdivision B and therefore the post-election
picketing was not banned by that subdivision.68
It would seem clear that in an unfair labor practice proceeding under
subdivision B, the Board does have the right to review all questions re-
lating to the validity of the election including the propriety of directing
it.69 However it is not clear that an election is wanting in validity
solely on the ground that it was expedited absent any showing of pre-
63 Specifically an expedited election procedure dispenses with the requirements
of a showing of substantial interest and the pre-election hearing. However,
the regional Director may direct a hearing if there are substantial issues
which may require determination before an election may be held. STATEMENTS
OF PROCEDURES, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. §101.23 (c).64 Oakland G. R. Kinney Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 335, 49 L.R.R.M. 1771 (1962).
65 Hested Stores Co., supra note 60.
66 Oakland G. R. Kinney Co., supra note 64.
67 "Provided further, that nothing in this subparagraph (c) shall be construed
to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ
members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of
such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the
course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or
not to perform any services."
68 Oakland G. R. Kinney Co., supra note 64. Member Leedom dissented on the
ground that the pre-election picketing did constitute a violation of subdivision
C and therefore the expedited election was properly directed and valid.
69 N.L.R.B. v. Local 182 IBT, supra note 21, at 60.
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judice thereby, nor is it free from doubt that picketing which meets the
requirements of the publicity proviso of section 8(b) (7) (C) renders
the expedited procedure inapplicable.70
Another ground upon which the validity of the election has been
challenged, in an unfair labor practice proceeding under subdivision
B, is the claim that the employer was guilty of unfair labor practices
which had not been remedied.7 1 This challenge would appear to arise in
an election where it is claimed that the rights of the employees were
interfered with the General Counsel refused to issue a complaint. 2
This however would not preclude the union7 3 in a subdivision B pro-
ceeding from raising the issue and establishing, if the facts permit, the
fact that a fair election was denied the employees by reason of the em-
ployer's misconduct.74
(e) The Date a Violation Occurs; the Date for Computing the Remedy
An important consideration in the application of subdivision B is
the date that organizational or recognitional picketing comes within the
proscription of this subdivision. The act merely prohibits the picketing
after a valid election. Obviously this can not mean the day following the
day an election is held because an election can not be said to be valid
until the Board has so determined by way of certification of the results.
This is the practice eventually adopted by the Board 5 and would appear
to be in accord with the legislative history.76
The determination of a date for providing an appropriate remedy
is equally important. The Board has decided that as a general policy
remedial orders in subdivision B cases will direct that the proscribed
picketing shall cease for a period of twelve months and that the twelve
70oId. at 61n.8.
71 Id. at 59. This defense would not be picketing in protest of an unfair labor
practice, but rather the ground would be that the employer's misconduct
prevented a fair and free election.
72 Otherwise, if the charge is a meritorious one, it appears to be the Board's
position now that if it is an 8(a) (5) charge, refusal to bargain, it will not
entertain the representation petition and thus avoid an election. If it is any
other 8(a) charge the election will be delayed pending a resolution of the
unfair labor practice charges so as to afford an atmosphere conducive to a
free and fair election. C. A. Blinne Construction Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 49
L.R.R.M. 1638, 1644 (1962); Bachman Furniture Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 670, 49
L.R.R.M. 1192 (1961).73 Provided the union availed itself of the appeal procedures set forth in the
Board's Statements of Procedure, both as to the refusal to issue a complaint
and as to the decision directing the holding of an election. Statements of
Procedure, §§101.6 and 101.23(b). Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra
note 49.
74 N.L.R.B. v. Local 182, IBT, supra note 21, at 60, 61.
75Irvins, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 686, 49 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1961); Penello v. Retail
Stores Employees, supra note 13. Although the Board in an earlier decision,
Macatee, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 683, 46 L.R.R.M. 1069 (1960), computed the 12
month ban from the date of the election, it reconsidered its order and modi-
fied it in 135 N.L.R.B. 62, 49 L.R.R.M. 1418 (1962) to conform to its policy
In Irvuns supra.76 11 LEG. HIST. 1187(3), 1361(1), 1462(3).
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month period shall be computed from the date the labor organization
terminates its picketing activity either voluntarily or involuntarily.
77
Thus the Board has, in adopting this formula, banned picketing beyond
the twelve month period provided in the legislation. For example in
the Irvins case,7 the election was held on August 18th and the results
certified on August 26th but the picketing continued until enjoined by
the district court on October 3rd. The remedial order issued banned
picketing by the respondent for a twelve month period beginning Octo-
ber 3rd. Thus the picketing was banned not for 12 months following
the valid election but for a period in excess of thirteen months. The
validity of this practice by the Board is not free from doubt.7 9
The Board contends however that in adopting this remedial pro-
cedure it is not contravening congressional intent rather it is implement-
ing it in securing to employers and employees a twelve month period
free from the inconvenience and harassment of picketing. 0 The Board
recognizes that this rule will be subjected to modification in certain
circumstances such as when the picketing continues up to the time of
the issuance of the Board order or where the picketing has been
intermittent.
Subdivision C
8
1
The history of the interpretation and application of this subdivision
might be characterized as the "War of the Provisos." In the sharp
77 Irvins, Inc., supra note 75.
78 Ibid.
79 N.L.R.B. v. Local 128, IBT, supra note 21, at 53n.9. The court declined to pass
on the propriety of this practice. It is interesting to note also in this case
that though the twelve month period fixed by the Board had already expired
by the time of the court's decision, the order was nevertheless enforced.80 The Board's practice would appear to be within the allowable area of the
Board's discretion in carrying out congressional policy. Brooks v. National
Labor Relations Board, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
81 Section 8(b). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents-
"(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to
be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representa-
tive of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer
to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining repre-
sentative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the repre-
sentative of such employees:
"(c) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed
thirty days from the commencement of such picketing; provided, that when
such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard
to the provisions of section 9(c) (1) or the absence of a showing of a sub-
stantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election
in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results
thereof: provided further, that nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be
construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does
not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless
an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any
other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or
transport any goods or not to perform any services."
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division among the the members of the Board as to the subdivision's
application, each faction relies upon the same proviso8 2 to sustain its
respective position. Each faction appears dismayed that the other fails
to acknowledge the clarity of the language of the proviso and to give
effect to the clear intent of the Congress.
In fairness to the participants in this conflict, the seeds of such
dissension were sown in the Halls of Congress in the drafting and
other legislative processes necessary to produce this legislation. Pro-
fessor Cox's comment of "conflicting intentions"' has perhaps greater
application to subdivision C than to either of the other two subdivisions
of section 8(b) (7).
In fact it would be a fair comment to state that the only unanimity
of intention in the enactment of section 8(b) (7) and particularly in
subdivision C was that there should be some limitation on organiza-
tional and recognitional picketing.
A brief recapitulation of the legislative history of this subdivision
may be helpful, if not necessary, to demonstrate these "conflicting
intentions" and thus to make more comprehensible the Board's con-
struction and interpretation of it.
The restrictions on organizational and recognitional picketing as
passed by the Senate were limited to areas corresponding to subdivi-
sions A and B as enacted and there was not any provision covering or
relating to the area now dealt with in subdivision C.8 4 The Landrum
Griffin Bill as passed by the House did ban organizational and recog-
nitional picketing where it "had been engaged in for a reasonable
period of time (not exceeding thirty days) and at the expiration of
which period no petition under section 9(c) has been filed."' 5 In sub-
stance this was the present subdivision C without the provisos. The
conferees of both Houses thereafter brought forth the subdivision in
its present form. 6
Senator Kennedy in analyzing subdivision C said it accepts the
House provision "except that picketing would be permitted to continue
without a petition if it appealed only to the employees to join the union
or the public not to patronize the nonunion establishment without
causing truckers or the employees of other employers to refuse to
cross the picket line."187 In substance Senator Kennedy's interpretation
of this subdivision was the same as that of Professor Cox:
82 Reference is to the second proviso in subdivision C the "publicity proviso:'
83 Cox, supra note 9, at 266.
84 S. 1555, 86th Co g., 1st Sess. §708 (1959) as passed by the Senate. I LEG.
HIST. 583-84.85H.R. 8400, 86th Cong. §705(c) (1959) as passed by the House. II LEG. HisT.
1700(3).
86 See note 81 supra.
S7 II LEG. HIST. 1384(1). Also Senator Kennedy: "Picketing, in the absence of
a contract or an election, which has only the effect of notifying the public
1963-1964]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Picketing before a union election is divided by Section 8(b) (7)
into two categories: (1) picketing which halts pick-up or
deliveries by independent trucking concerns or the rendition of
services by the employees of other employers, and (2) picketing
which appeals only to employees in the establishment and mem-
bers of the public.
The latter "publicity picketing": is placed under no limitation;
the former "signal picketing": is that which is regulated by subdivi-
sion C.89
However it does not appear that this interpretation was shared by
all the members of the Congress. Senator Goldwater's analysis of
this subdivision, for example:
A union may not picket for recognitional or for organizational
purposes for more than a reasonable period which may be less
than 30 days if the Board so determines, but may not be longer,
without a petition for a representation election being filed with
the Board. If no such petition is filed in such period, * * * *
such picketing becomes an unfair labor practice.
Where the union engages in picketing or other publicity for the
sole purpose of truthfully advising the public that an employer
does not employ members of or have a contract with a labor
union. In those circumstances, such picketing may be carried
on indefinitely.90
In brief the "Kennedy-Cox" interpretation would be that absent a
contract or an election, organizational or recognitional picketing would
be banned only if it had the effect of interfering with or disrupting
the employer's business by way of stoppages of deliveries or of services
by employees of other employers. 91
Whereas the "Goldwater-Griffin" interpretation would be that all
organizational and recognitional picketing is banned after a reasonable
period of time without a representation petition being filed. Excepted
however is "picketing or other publicity directed to consumers which
is for limited purposes" and which does not have the proscribed effect.
92
The difference between these two interpretations is basic, and the
difficulty presented thereby is enhanced by the fact that each position
does find support in the legislative history and by that fact that neither
position is invulnerable as a matter of statutory construction. However
it does not appear to be undue criticism to observe that the statute
of non-union conditions, and asking the employees to join the union would
not be banned." Id. at 1377 (3). See also Id. at 1431(3).
ss Cox, supra note 9, at 267.
89 Ibid.
90 11 LE. HIsT., 1858(3) (Provided of course that it does not have the pro-
scribed effect.) See also Sen. Dirksen's remarks, id. at 1823 (2) ; Cong. Pucin-
ski, id. at 1820(3) 1821(1). Cong. Griffin, id. at 1812(1).
91 Id. at 1377(3).
92 Id. at 1812(1).
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could have been drafted so as to express more clearly the interpreta-
tion advanced by Senator Kennedy and Professor Cox.93
In any event this was the legislative heritage entrusted to the Board
to administer and it is thus not too difficult to understand the dis-
sension and perhaps the confusion that has resulted."
The Board, however, in its first decision construing this sub-
division did not have to meet this problem because the picketing which
was the subject matter of the proceeding therein did have the pro-
scribed effect. 95 The decision did however resolve initially some basic
questions concerning subdivision C such as that the subdivision does
regulate peaceful picketing and that the proscribed effect of the pub-
licity proviso, i.e., stoppage of deliveries and services need not be the
intended effect. 96 However, the unanimity generally present in this
decision was not to be of long duration.
Crown and Crown Revisited
The Board was confronted with the "conflicting intentions" of the
Congress in the Crown Cafeteria Case.9 7 In that case there was picket-
ing for more than thirty days without a petition under section 9(c)
having been filed. There was evidence, independent of the language
on the picket signs, that an object of the picketing was to secure recog-
nition. The trial examiner concluded that the picketing, even though
for an object of recognition or organization, was within the protection
of the publicity proviso of subdivision C.9 s because it did not have the
effect of inducing any stoppage of goods or services. Thus the trial
examiner clearly espoused the Kennedy-Cox interpretation of this
subdivision, i.e., absent a contract or election, organizational or recog-
nitional picketing is not banned unless it results in stoppages of de-
liveries or services.
9 3 1n making this observation, however, one must be mindful of the fact that
perhaps the realities of the situation, at the time the Congress was considering
this legislation would not have permitted it.
94 It was recognized by the courts fairly early in the life of subdivision C that
various interpretations were possible. N.L.R.B. v. Local 239, IBT, 289 F. 2d
41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 833 (1961) ; although some courts did
not hesitate to adopt the Kennedy-Cox interpretation, Roumell v. Local 154,
Typographical Union, 49 L.R.R.M. 2038 (1961) ; Lebus v. Building & Construc-
tion Trades Council, 199 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. La. 1961). See also a recent
decision of the court of appeals, N.L.R.B. v. Local 3, IBEW, 317 F. 2d 193(2d Cir.), 53 L.R.R.M. 2116 (1963).
Other courts appeared to have accepted the Goldwater-Griffin interpreta-
tion: Alpert v. Local 271, Hod Carriers, 198 F. Supp. 395 (D.R.I. 1961);
Consentino v. Local 618, Automotive Employees, 200 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Mo.),
49 L.R.R.M. 2309 (1960).
95 Stan-Jay Auto Parts and Accessories Corporation, 127 N.L.R.B. 958, 46
L.R.R.M. 1123 (1960), enf'd, NLRB v. Local 239, IBT, 289 F. 2d 41 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 833 (1961).
96 Ibid.
97 130 N.L.R.B. 570, 47 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1961).
9 Note 81 supra.
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The majority of the Board, as then constituted, rejected the trial
examiner's interpretation and conclusion, holding that picketing is
immunized by the publicity proviso only when it is for the sole purpose
of advising the public that the employer is nonunion or does not have
a union contract. 99 Thus if the informational or publicity picketing
has a "present object of recognition" it is not within the publicity
proviso. 10 0
The two dissenting members would have affirmed the trial ex-
aminer, pointing out that the majority's "interpretation of the proviso
renders it wholly ineffectual." The dissent argued that the Congress
intended to permit a kind of picketing which but for the proviso would
have come within the prohibition of the section. "It logically follows
that the intent was to exclude from the ban picketing which, while it
embraced the proscribed object of recognition or organization, was
nonetheless permitted because it met two specific conditions." The
two conditions referred to were (a) truthfully advising the public as
to the nonunion character of the establishment and (b) the absence of
an effect of a stoppage of deliveries or services.
This decision was reconsidered by the Board (a change in mem-
bership of the Board having occurred in the interim) and the dissent-
ing opinion in the original was adopted as the ruling of the Board,1° 1
thus bringing the Kennedy-Cox interpretation out of what was but a
temporary eclipse.
The reversal of the Board's ruling can not be attributed to a re-
consideration of the problem in the usual sense but was the result
solely of the change in personnel.
In support of the reversal or reconsideration, the newly constituted
majority pointed out that the express words of the proviso "does not
employ members of" clearly imports a present object of organization
and "[does not] have a contract with" just as clearly implies a recog-
nitional and bargaining object and that therefore Congress must have
intended that the publicity proviso applies where organization, recog-
nition or bargaining is an object of the picketing.
The dissenters in this supplemental decision set forth their position
with greater clarity than was the case in their original opinion. The
dissenters argued in substance as follows:
(a) the ban of subdivision C applies to picketing having an
organizational or recognitional object.
'9 "We cannot believe that Congress meant to permit picketing merely because
the picketing takes the form of truthfully advising the public that the em-
ployer is nonunion or does not have a union contract. Rather we believe
that Congress was careful to state that picketing will be permitted only if
it is for 'the' purpose of so advising the public." Note 97 supra, at 1323.
100 This would be in keeping with the Goldwater-Griffin interpretation.
101 Crown Cafeteria, Supplemental Decision, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183, 49 L.R.R.M.
1648 (1961).
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(b) the ban would thus apply to picketing, which advised the
public that the employees were non-union or that the em-
ployer does not have a contract with the union because an
object of the picketing would necessarily be organization
and recognition respectively.
(c) Congress exempted such picketing from the prohibition for
the purpose of truthfully so advising the public.
(d) if the publicity picketing has any other purpose than advis-
ing the public it is not exempted from the ban.
(e) therefore where there is evidence, independent of the
picketing itself using signs which conform to the language
of the proviso, of an organizational or recognitional object,
such picketing is not within the exemption of the proviso.
Both the positions of the majority and of the dissent in the supple-
mental decision are each supported by cogent arguments. However
the majority does not appear in its ratiocinations to have given due
consideration to the use of the words "for the purpose" in the publicity
proviso. These words do limit the application of the publicity proviso
and it would follow logically that if the publicity picketing has any
other or even another purpose it loses the immunization of "the pro-
viso.10 2 Thus if it were shown that the tactical purpose of the picketing
was to signal economic action it would seem to be without the protec-
tion of the publicity proviso even though the signs conformed to the
language of the proviso and the picketing did not have the proscribed
effect.' 03
On the other hand it must be recognized that even in circumstances
in which the dissent would hold the picketing to be within the protec-
tion of the publicity proviso, that the ultimate objective of the picketing
may be organization and recognition, and the development of standards
or criteria to be used in distinguishing a present object from an ulti-
mate one, would be a formidable task.
The impact of the Crown decision is pointed out quite vividly in
Fowler Hotel Inc.'0 There the conceded object of the picketing was
for "renewal of the contract" and the picket signs so stated. The
majority of the Board held that the picketing was within the protec-
tion of the publicity proviso and as the proscribed effect was absent,
subdivision C was not violated.10 5 Here the stated purpose of the
picketing was to obtain a renewal of the contract. There was evidence
independent of the language of the picket signs that this was the object
10Z There are frequent references in the legislative history to the publicity
picketing characterizing it as "purely information." II LEG. HisT. 1720(3),
1431 (3), 1"10 (2).103 NLRB v. Local 3, IBEW, supra note 94, at 2120, 2121.
104 138 N.L.R.B. 125, 52 L.R.R.M. 1180 (1963).
105 See also Oakland G. R. Kinney Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 335, 49 L.R.R.M. 1771
(1962).
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of the picketing thus the conclusion that the purpose of the picketing
was to advise the public is difficult to sustain.
The cases subsequent to Crown in which the majority did find the
picketing in violation of the subdivision, other than because of the
proscribed effect, 106 indicate that the majority is taking cognizance of
the language in the proviso "for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public" in ruling that the publicity proviso picketing is to be directed
to the public and not to the employees of the picketed employer. In
Atlantic Maintenance Co.,10 7 the Board found that the picketing though
ostensibly directed at the public was in fact focused upon the employees
qua employees and as such was not for informational purposes and
therefore not within the proviso. Similarly in Ypsilanti Press, Inc.0 s
where the picketing was extended to entrances and parking lots set
aside for use of employees, the picketing was held not immunized by
the publicity proviso. In Jack Picoult,10 9 the picketing was focused on
employees of secondary employees and thus not protected.
These latter cases indicate a departure, though slight, by the "new"
majority of the Board from a wholeharted espousal of the Kennedy-
Cox view of subdivision C. 10 For the Kennedy-Cox interpretation
would remove from the ban of this subdivision picketing which "ap-
peals only to employees in the establishment.""' The "new" majority,
while it apparently believes that the Kennedy-Cox interpretation is one
that is more compatible with and would best effectuate the purpose of
the entire Labor Act, appears in these latter cases to be aware that the
language itself of the subdivision is not in complete and clear accord
with the Kennedy-Cox view. While the intent of the drafters of
legislation is certainly to be accorded great weight nevertheless it may
not be used to prevail over the language of the legislation itself.
In the main, however, the difference in the Board as to the inter-
pretation of subdivision C as expressed in the Crown Case revisited,
still persists." 2
106 Cases in which the Board found a violation because of proscribed effect:
Joe Hunt's Restaurant, 138 N.L.R.B. 470, 51 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1962); Sam
Melson, General Contractor, 138 N.L.R.B. 460, 51 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1962);
Marriott Motor Hotels, 136 N.L.R.B. 759, 49 L.R.R.M. 1839 (1962) ; Charlie's
Car Wash Service, 136 N.L.R.B. 934, 49 L.R.R.M. 1891 (1962).
107 136 N.L.R.B. 1104,49 L.R.R.M. 1939 (1962).
108 137 N.L.R.B. 1116, 50 L.R.R.M. 1312 (1962).
109 137 N.L.R.B. 1401, 50 L.R.R.M 1411 (1962); remanded to the Board for
further findings, N.L.R.B. v. Local 3, IBEW, supra note 94.110 The fact that the new majority does espouse the Kennedy-Cox interpretation
is made clear by their analysis of §8(b) (7) (C) in Barker Bros. Corp. &
Gold's Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 478, 51 L.R.R.M. 1053, 1055, 1056 n. 22 (1962).
"' See references in notes 87 and 88 supra.112 Jumbo Food Stores Inc., 36 N.L.R.B. 414, 49 L.R.R.M. 1798); Saturn &
Sedran Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 524, 49 L.R.R.M. 1803 (1962); Jay Jacobs Down-
town Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. -, 52 L.R.R.M. 1237 (1963) ; Martino's Complete
Home Furnishings, 141 N.L.R.B. -, 52 L.R.R.M. 1347 (1963).
[Vol. 47
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
In summary the respective positions of the majority and dissent are:
Majority: Picketing for an object of organization and recog-
nition directed to the public, including consumers, is not barred
by subdivision C unless it has the proscribed effect for the
publicity proviso carved out a significant exception to the gen-
eral ban on recognition and organizational picketing.1 13
Dissent: The publicity proviso carves out for informational
picketing a narrow exception to the general limitation or recog-
nitional and organizational picketing which is contained in sub-
division C. Informational picketing is protected only if the
language on the picket sign is consistent with language of pro-
viso and there is no independent evidence of either a recog-
nitional or organizational object." 4
It appears that this difference in the basic interpretation of sub-
division C shall continue until there is a definitive interpretation by
the Supreme Court. It would seem desirable that this latter event
occur prior to a change in the Administration so as to avoid what
might be in effect a re-reconsideration of the Crown case.
Other Considerations of Subdivision C
(a) A Reasonable Period
Subdivision C by its terms proscribes organizational or recognitional
picketing if a representation petition is not filed "within a reasonable
period of time" not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of
the picketing. 1 5
Congress did not define "a reasonable period of time" but it is
clear from the language of the subdivision and the legislative history
that picketing for less than thirty days without a petition having been
filed may give rise to a violation of the subdivision."16
Obviously no general rule could be enunciated as to what would
constitute "a reasonable period." Rather it is clear that Congress in-
A difference also exists as to the language on the picket signs. Although
the terms of the publicity proviso do prescribe the subject matter of the
picketing permitted under the proviso, the majority of the Board has ruled
that the legends on the picket signs need not be in haec verba. Jay Jacobs
Downtown Inc., supra. In that case the picket signs appealed to the public
to patronize union stores, a list of which were set forth on the placards. The
majority concluded that this was but an explicit statement of what is implicit
in the publicity proviso. See also Fowler Hotel Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 125, 52
L.R.R.M. 1180 (1962).
As to the question of the truthfulness of the picket signs see the majority
and dissenting opinions in Barker Bros. Corp. & Gold's Inc., 138 N.L.R.B.
478, 51 L.R.R.M. 1053 (1962) ; Jay Jacobs Downtown Inc., supra; N.L.R.B.
v. Local 3, IBEW, supra note 94.
113 Jumbo Food Stores, Inc., supra note 112.
114 Dissent in Jay Jacobs Downtown, Inc., supra note 112.
115 See note 81 supra for complete text of subdivision C.
116 Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. - , 52 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1963);
Cong. Griffin, II LEG. HIST. 1812(1) : "Of course, the picketing may be en-joined in less then 30 days if the Board finds the circumstances are such as
to make it unreasonable to permit it to continue and it must be stopped at
the end of 30 days."
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tended to delegate to the Board the power to resolve this issue on a
case by case basis.
Violence or other coercive conduct on the part of the picketing
union has been a factor in the determination that a violation arose
even though the picketing was for a period of less than thirty days.'17
Absent violence or similar misconduct the Board apparently will
let the union have near full measure," 8 even though the picketing
results in some stoppages of deliveries. 19
Under this case by case determination, a union may be placed in
a disadvantageous position. For example if a union picketed for 25
days and filed a representation petition on the 26th day and the Board
determines post facto that 25 days was an unreasonable period under
the circumstances, there will be a violation of subdivision C. The filing
of the petition on the 26th day will not prevent the issuance of a cease
and desist order prohibiting any further picketing.
20
Thus it would behoove a union which wishes to comply with the
mandate of the subdivision to file the petition reasonably soon after
commencement of the picketing.
(b) Expedited Election'21
The subject of an expedited election has been considered, in part,
in the discussion of subdivision B.'12 However it would be desirable
to discuss it further here even though some repetition will be involved.
The Board has ruled that the expedited election procedure is per-
missible only when the picketing is in violation of Subdivision C.'1 23
This would mean under the new Crown decision that the expedited
election could occur only where the picketing had the proscribed
effect" 4 or where the picketing though purportedly for the purpose
of advising the public was in fact directed at the picketed employer's
employees. 125 Picketing which satisfies the requirements of the pub-
licity proviso of subdivision C would therefore not be subject to an
117 Ten days was considered an unreasonable period in Cuneo v. United Shoe
Workers, 181 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1960), and 26 days in Eastern Camera &
Photo Corp., supra note 116.
118 Colson & Stevens Constr. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1650, 50 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962).
In this case one union picketed from October 19 to November 17, 1960 and
another union, a member of the same Trades Council picketed from January
26, to February 20, 1961.
119 Ibid.
120 Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., supra note 116.
121 This relates to the first proviso of subdivision C: "Provided that when such a
petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the pro-
visions of Section 9(c) (1) or the absence of a showing of substantial interest
on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the
Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof."
122 See discussion of subdivision B supra in text, particularly the subheading
"Validity of Election."
123 Oakland G. R. Kinney Co., Inc., supra note 105.
124 See Crown Cafeteria, supra note 101.
125 Atlantic Maintenance Co., supra note 107.
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expedited election.126 It has been suggested by a court of appeals, by
way of dictum, that a reading of section 8(b) (7) (C) permits of an
interpretation that the expedited election procedure is applicable to
publicity proviso picketing.1 27 The court's interpretation of the language
of subdivision C in reaching this conclusion is difficult to find fault
with. However under the court's suggested construction purely pub-
licity picketing could be curtailed' 28 and this would seem to contravene
congressional intent as reflected in the legislative history. 2 9
The Board in the C. A. Blinne Construction Co.'130 case made two
gratuitous observations concerning expedited elections which warrant
a brief consideration. First, a union may not obtain an expedited
election simply by engaging in organizational or recognitional picketing
and filing a representation petition. This observation is in accord with
Congressional intent.1 1 Second, a picketing union which files a repre-
sentation petition "pursuant to the mandate of section 8(b) (7) (C) and
to avoid its sanctions will not be propelled into an expedited elec-
tion."I-n The statement is quite confusing. If the Board refers to a
situation where the picketing is regulated by subdivision C133 and the
union files a petition on the day the picketing commences and the
employer thereafter files an 8(b) (7) (C) charge, it is unclear why
the expedited election procedure would not be applicable. For an
expedited election was directed where the petition was filed prior to
the commencement of the picketing."T
(c) The Proscribed Effect
As noted previously the publicity proviso of subdivision C im-
munizes picketing "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
* * * unless the effect of such picketing is to induce any individual
employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not
to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any
services."
'126 C. A. Blinne Construction Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 49 L.R.R.M. 1638 (1962).
Cf. Reed v. Roumell, 185 F. Supp. 4 (E. D. Mich. 1960).
127 N.L.R.B. v. Local 182, IBT, 314 F. 2d 53, 61, 62n.8 (2d Cir. 1963).
128 If the union were forced into an election and lost, it would be subject to
an 8(b) (7) (B) charge if it continued picketing.
129 Senator Kennedy, II LEG. HisT. 1431 (3) ; Senator Dirksen, id. at 1823 (2).
130 See note 126 supra.
'31 See Cong. Barden's statement, II LEG. HIsT. 1813 (1). This is true even if
a charge is filed by one fronting for the picketing union. See note 10 supra;
C. A. Blinne Construction Co. case, supra note 126.
132 C. A. Blinne Construction Co., supra. note 126, at 1640.
133 The Board can mean only this, otherwise there would be no necessity to file
a petition.
:14 Woodward Motor, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 851, 49 L.R.R.M. 1577, (1962) enforced,
N.L.R.B. v. Local 182, IBC, supra note 127. The fact that the petition in the
Woodward case, supra, was filed by the employer is not material because
the subdivision does not distinguish between a petition filed by an employer
or by the union; nor does the Board's regulation, §102.76.
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Obviously if this "effect" clause is construed literally then the
proscribed effect would occur if but one individual, employed by one
other than the picketed employer, refused to perform services.
The Board decided in the tetralogy of September 7, 1962 not to
accord the "effect" clause this literal construction. 135  The Board'36
reasoned that the effect clause may not be invoked merely on the basis
of a few isolated instances of drivers refusing to cross the picket line.
Rather the Board concluded that the effect clause is applicable only
where the refusal to perform services or to make deliveries is of such
a character as to interfere with, disrupt or curtail the picketed em-
ployer's operation.1 37 Thus where in twelve weeks of picketing at
eighteen of the employers stores there were three delivery stoppages,
several delivery delays and two work delays, the picketing was not
found to have had the proscribed effect in the absence of any evidence
of the impact such stoppages or delay had on the employer's business."8s
The Board emphasized that it is not the number of stoppages per se
that will determine the existence of the proscribed effect rather the
point of inquiry will be the actual impact of such stoppages upon the
operations of the picketed employer's business. "That is, the presence
or absence of a violation will depend upon whether the picketing has
disrupted, interfered with or curtailed the employer's business.""39
The majority, using this standard, found a proscribed effect where
liquor deliveries could not be made to the employer's establishment but
were made to a neutral location where the employer arranged to pick
up the supplies,' 4 and where the employees of subcontractors refused
to cross the picket line.'
4 1
The dissent14 2 differed basically with the majority. The dissent
contended that the "effect" clause was to be construed literally so that if
one individual refused to make a delivery the proscribed effect would
have been had, apart from any consideration as to the extent, if any,
that the stoppages affected business operations.
1"5 Barker Bros. Corp. & Gold's Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 478, 51 L.R.R.M. 1053 (1962);
Hested Stores Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 1393, 51 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1962); Joe Hunt's
Restaurant, 138 N.L.R.B. 470, 51 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1962) ; Sam Melson, General
Contractor, 138 N.L.R.B. 460, 51 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1962).
138 In reaching this conclusion the Board was divided as in the Crown case.
The "new" majority in the Crown decision constituted the majority here.
137 Barker Bros. Corp. & Gold's Inc., supra note 135.
138 Ibid. A significant factor in the Board's consideration of the problem was
the fact that the picketing union made an effort to avoid any interference
with deliveries or rendition of services.
139 Id. at 1057.
140 Joe Hunt's Restaurant, supra note 135.
141 Sam Melson, General Contractor, supra note 135.
142 The dissent in Barker Bros. and in Hested relying upon their dissent in the
supplemental decision in the Crown case would have found a violation of
§8(b) (7) (C) on the ground that the picketing had a present object of recogni-
tion, bargaining and organization and therefore was outside the protection
of the publicity proviso.
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In an effort to justify their respective interpretations the majority
and dissent entered upon what might be termed the battle of "the
singular and plural." Each faction resorted to the legislative history,
the former to cite references indicating more than a single stoppage
or delay was intended in order to make the "effect" clause applicable, 143
the latter cited references to the contrary. 44 However, the legislative
history is not at all persuasive on this point.
The position of the majority is clearly a more realistic one. Purely
informational picketing should not be prohibited unless it does result
in an interference with the operation of the employer's business. The
mere fact that one driver refused to make a delivery should not provide
a basis for the curtailment of all picketing.
However the issue is not what the Board, in its conceded expertise,
considers to be the most desirable course so as to strike a balance
between the rights of labor and management in this area. Rather the
issue is what did Congress say. Congress said the picketing could not
be curtailed "unless an effect * * * is to induce any individual * * *
not to perform any service." This language is clear. This language is
unambiguous. It is quite difficult to comprehend how this language
could be construed other than to mean that if one individual employed
by another employer refuses to perform services because of the picket-
ing, the proscribed effect has been established.'45 There is nothing in
the language of the "effect" clause which would otherwise qualify or
alter such a construction. 46
Admittedly this construction may render the "effect" clause in-
effectual to a large extent and may result in an imbalance in favor of
management. However the Board's task is to administer the legislation
enacted by the Congress and not to in effect amend the legislation so
as to accomplish what a particular majority deems to have been con-
gressional intent where the language chosen by the Congress is quite
clear.
(d) Protest Picketing
In the consideration of subdivision B above, it was noted that the
majority of the Board has concluded that picketing in protest of unfair
labor practices, the discharge of employees, or substandard wages is
not per se a demand for recognition or bargaining, and therefore,
absent any independent evidence of a proscribed object, such picketing
would not be within the proscriptions of section 8(b) (7).
The same considerations therein discussed would, in the main, have
equal application to cases under subdivision C, namely the difficulty of
43 II LEG. HIsT. 1377(3), 1431 (3), 1722(2).
144Id. at 1858(3), 1729(1).
145 Absent of course any evidence that the effect was achieved by some collusive
conduct on the part of the picketed employer.
146 See Cong. Roosevelt's analysis, II LEG. HIST. 1729(1).
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divorcing such picketing from a proscribed object. It would therefore
be repetitious and quite unnecessary to undertake a discussion of
protest picketing under subdivision C.
4 7
However, in view of the fact that some criticism of the Board's
position was made,'-" it should be pointed out that the Board is, as in the
cases under subdivision B, not loathe to find violations where there is
some independent eveidence that the protest picketing is a device to
conceal a proscribed object' 49 or that the protest is not made in good
faith.150
(e) Employer's Unfair Labor Practices as a defense to a charge
under subdivision C.
The majority opinion in Blinne'5' recognized, after a rather pro-
longed discussion, that the Congress did not intend "to write an ex-
emption into section 8(b) (7) (C) dispensing with the necessity for
filing a representation petition whenever employer unfair labor practices
were alleged."
The legislative history of section 8(b) (7) not only supports this
statement but would support a more definitive one, namely, that Con-
gress did not intend that any section 8(a) violation, save section
8(a) (2) would constitute a defense to a charge under section 8(b) (7).
The legislation as passed by the Senate 152 specifically provided "That
where a charge is filed under section 8(b) (7) it shall be a defense to
show that an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 8(a)
has been committed."' 153 The legislation as passed by the House did
not contain a similar or comparable provision.
5 4
Unquestionably the Senate conferees were of a mind to persuade
the House conferees of the desirability of accepting a provision similar
in concept to that passed by the Senate.'
5 5
Finally the fact is that the law, as enacted, did not contain the pro-
vision in the Senate bill but it did provide rather that if a meritorious
147 Cases under subdivision C dealing with this subject matter include: Protest
of (a) discharge; see Fanelli Ford Sales Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 1468, 49 L.R.R.M.
1021 (1961), (b) substandard wages; see Claude Everett Contractors Assn.,
136 N.L.R.B. 321, 49 L.R.R.M. 1757 (1962) ; Keith Riggs Plumbing & Heat-
ing Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 1125, 50 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1962); Texarkana Constr.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 102, 50 L.R.R.M. 1565 (1962).
14s See discussion of subdivision B, supra in text.
'49 Eastern Camera, 141 N.L.R.B. -, 52 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1963).
150 Alfred S. Austin Constr. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. - , 52 L.R.R.M. 1309 (1963).
151 C. A. Blinne, supra note 126. This decision like new Crown decision supra
is a reconsideration of a prior Board decision (130 N.L.R.B. 587). Unlike
Crown however the Board reaffirmed the order issued under the prior deci-
sion.
152 S. 1555, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. §708 (1959), I LEG. HIST. 583-84.
15 Ibid.
54 H.R. No. 8400, 86th Cong., §705(c) (1959), II LEG. HIsT. 1700(3).
'55 11. LEG. HIST. 1383(2).
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section 8(a) (2) charge was filed injunctive relief may not be sought
in a proceeding brought under an 8(b) (7) charge.'56
Thus it is clear that the Congress did not intend that an employer's
unfair labor practice (save an 8(a) (2) violation) would constitute a
defense to a charge filed under section 8(b) (7).257
Nevertheless the majority opinion in the Blinne decision in the
obscurity of a footnote and by way of dictum advanced the pronounce-
ment that the filing of a meritorious charge under section 8(a) (5)
(refusal to bargain with a union which represents a majority of the
employees) will dispense with the requirement of filing a petition in a
section 8(b)(7)(C) situation and picketing may continue undis-
turbed. 5 "
The majority reasoned that a meritorious section 8(a) (5) charge
moots the question of representation because if a union has been
designated as the bargaining representative of the majority of the
employees there is no question of representation to be resolved by an
election and thus no need for a petition. Further reasoned the ma-
jority, as the Board has in the past uniformly refused to entertain
representation petitions where a meritorious "refusal to bargain" charge
has been filed, Congress in enacting section 8(b) (7) (C) must have
acquiesced in such practice. The majority's reasoning is certainly
questionable.
Congress must have been equally aware of the Board's practice in
not applying the contract bar rule unless the union had an uncoerced
majority at the time the contract was executed and there were no
conflicting claims to recognition, 59 yet Congress deemed it necessary
to provide that an 8(a) (2) violation would bar injunctive relief in an
8(b) (7) (A) proceeding.160 No similar provision was made by the
Congress with respect to a refusal to bargain charge.
This is not to say that the majority's position is without merit
insofar as it may be a more desirable practice in such a situation
Rather the question is whether the majority's position is one sanctioned
by the Congress and on the basis of the legislative history it appears
that this question must be answered in the negative.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion was concerned solely with the question
of whether the Board's administration of section 8(b) (7) is in accord
156 29 U.S.C. §160(2) (Supp. III, 1962).
157 Cf. Senator Morse's comment, II LEG. HiST. 1428(3)-1429(1).
258 Bachman Furniture Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 670, 49 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1961); 135
N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
159 Cox, supra note 9, at 265.
'10 The §8(a) (2) proviso was not limited by the Congress to a §8(b) (7) (A)
proceeding but applies to all subdivisions of §8(b) (7). However, generally
its application would be in a subdivision A proceeding.
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with Congressional intent and whether the objective of the enactment
is being realized.
In subdivision B, the position of the present majority of the Board
with respect to "protest picketing" appears to be too broad. Admittedly,
as noted in the discussion, there may be a few instances where the
banning of such "protest picketing" would not be in accord with Con-
gressional intent as expressed in the law itself or as reflected in the
legislative history, but the majority's rather sweeping approach to this
type of picketing would not seem to be in such accord. Rather it
would unduly circumscribe the use of this subdivision and perhaps
encourage its circumvention.
As to subdivision C, the majority's interpretation of the "publicity
proviso" gives to this proviso a status not warranted by the language
of the subdivision by making the exception the rule. Admittedly the
majority finds some support in the legislative history but in view of
the fact that there is also support in the legislative history to the con-
trary, the majority should not go beyond the language of the statute
which is not unclear.
The majority undoubtedly and sincerely believe that to accord the
"publicity proviso" the interpretation insisted upon by the minority
would seriously impair the use of a traditional weapon of labor. The
majority may be right. However if the legislation unduly harasses or
restricts labor, the remedy is to be provided by the Congress and not
by the Board.
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